What lies in the future of teaching the history of psychology? *
Gira Bhatt and Randal G. Tonks
Department of Psychology
Examining the issue of teaching the history of psychology, this paper begins with dialogue initiated by Danziger (1994) over the future of the history of psychology. A debate has emerged whether it is a celebratory "inside" history supporting contemporary views or a critical "outside" history offering a substantial contribution. In a parallel vein, Leahey (2000) has raised the question of the place of teaching history of psychology in the undergraduate curriculum. He contends that given the questionable coherence of psychology as a discipline, there seem to be no major "isms" and no "big pictures that students need to know". As well, the rapidly changing world warrants a major renovation of the course content. While this issue has been raised within APA, Canadian psychologists who teach the history of psychology face the similar issue as undergraduate and graduate programs are removing history from a central place in the curriculum. Is there a future for teaching of history of psychology? This paper offers comments on this issue, along with the results of a brief survey of psychology programs at Canadian universities.
Over a decade ago, when we were graduate students, we made a mistake (!) of pondering over the "big picture" of psychology. Before we knew it, we had the bug in our system and we were obsessed with psychology's history, the nature of the discipline, the philosophy of science, Danziger…and so on. While we riveted in our obsession, we also suffered. Our fellow graduate students made snide remarks about us, and called us "those theoretical types". Some faculty members also drew humor from our interest. But we survived. Graduate school sure makes you a hardy bunch!
When we got jobs and got to teach the undergraduate history of psychology course, we felt secure and delighted in the thought that we had finally "arrived". After all Guru Danziger had assured us of a promising future for the history of psychology. However, beginning around 1994 we witnessed a series of events at two psychology departments which shook us from our security zone. We noticed that the retired history of psychology positions were not being replaced. We noticed that the undergraduate course on the history of psychology was "cut" or "reduced" or no longer "required". We observed that the value of the history of psychology course was being discounted. We talked to some esteemed historians of psychology who were retiring and learned about their lost "ideological war fares" within the psychology departments. We began to wonder if these were random happenings or an indication of a gloomy future for the teachers of psychology's history? Is the undergraduate course on the history of psychology a case of "here today, gone tomorrow"? . It is within this pedagogical context that our paper was inspired.
Keeping within Danziger's (1994) analytical frame for the discipline, our attempt here is to trace the origins, trends, and threats to the undergraduate course on the history of psychology. Along the path of this exploration, we also compiled some course-related numbers as well as comments of the teachers of the history of psychology from across Canadian universities. Finally, this historical examination allowed for some reflections on the pedagogical status and the future of the course.
History of Psychology and the Undergraduate Curricula
Danziger (1994) observed that whereas the departments of physics, chemistry and other natural science disciplines do not offer an undergraduate course on the history of their respective disciplines, psychology departments routinely do. Danziger emphasized that this is largely due to the nature of the discipline and "a lingering belief that the history of psychology has a role within the discipline of psychology" (p. 467). This belief seems to have persevered over many decades now, as psychology departments across the continent not only routinely offer courses on the history of psychology, but often make it a "requirement" for a major. We conducted a web-based and e-mail survey of the undergraduate curricula of the history of psychology courses offered at 43 Canadian universities. Our observations supported this. (Table 1, Table 2).
Tracing the Pedagogical Origin of the History of Psychology
Interestingly, the earliest books on the history of psychology published were "textbooks" written for didactic purpose (Danziger, 1994). The year 1912 marked these beginnings with three publications: B. Rand's "Classical psychologists: Selections illustrating psychology from Anaxagoras to Wundt", G. Stanley Hall's "The founders of modern psychology" and G. S. Brett's first of the three massive volumes "A history of psychology" (Incidentally, Brett was a Canadian philosopher-psychologist) A year later in 1913, J. M. Baldwin published his 2 small volumes which are considered to be the first American textbook on the history of psychology in the 20th century. (Hilgard, Leary, & McGuire's, 1991). A discussion of the textbooks of the history of psychology would, of course remain deficient without the mention of the famous E.G. Boring who wrote the popular "A history of experimental psychology" in 1929. In the same year Gardener Murphy published his "Historical introduction to modern psychology", and Pillsbury published "The history of psychology".
Given the publication timeframe of these textbooks, and their didactic purpose, it would be reasonable to conclude that psychologists were discussing the history of psychology to their students as early as 1912. What may have triggered this trend? Why did early psychologists took interest in the history of psychology right from its inception in the early 20th century?
Upon examining the larger picture of the discipline at the time -between 1912 & 1929- when these publications began to emerge, it is interesting to note that this period also marked the dominance of the natural science status of psychology. In fact, Boring's 1929 history textbook has been viewed as an attempt on his part to defend the pure scientific nature of psychology from its "applied" sibling. As Graham Richards (1996) contends, these early books on the history of psychology were written because of the pressure that was experienced by the discipline "to prove its scientific credentials" (p. 2).
Since then, however, the discipline of psychology has undergone many renovations. It has grown and diversified exponentially. As well, it has witnessed many trends, "isms" and fads, raising doubts and debates about its status as a singular discipline (e.g., ). Amidst these trends and continual growth of the discipline, the course on the history of psychology has retained its place within the psychology curricula across the continent, and in many parts of the world. APA accreditation, for example, requires that psychology students should get exposed to the historical roots of the discipline. (Table 1 and Table 2)
The Rationale for Teaching Psychology's History
The issue as to why the history of psychology course gained and retained an esteemed status within the undergraduate course structure is worth examining. Michael Wertheimer (1980) critically summarized various reasons and justifications provided in the prefaces of various books on psychology's history. His first observation was that there seems to be a taken -for-granted attitude among the authors of psychology's history. We looked at the prefaces of the history of psychology textbooks published in the '90s and came to a similar conclusion. As Wertheimer observed,
None of these writers … bother to specify in a preface or introduction why they believe study of the history of psychology is worthwhile. There even are prolific contributors of the history of psychology (such as Josef Brozek) who have not bothered to say at length in print why they believe the history of psychology is a topic worth pursuing. By taking its value for granted, these scholars imply that it must be self-evident to any thinking person. Devoting space to justification of the endevour might even suggest that there might be some doubt about it in the first place!
There were few books which did list reasons for the study of psychology's history, which can be summarized as the following
A study of psychology's history 1) helps avoid the past errors and repetitions, 2) provides a fertile source of new ideas, 3) may offer resolutions of current problems, 4) provides a healthy dose of humility and tolerance, 5) improves general education of psychologists, and 6) "Simply because…"- everyone enjoys a good story; it is inherently interesting.
In addition, Wertheimer (1980) also examined the value of teaching of psychology's history from a disciplinarian perspective and highlighted three of them:
Nature of the Discipline: Locating the Pedagogical Status of Psychology's History
At a larger perspective, these assorted reasons and justifications may be brought together under one umbrella: the nature of the discipline. Is psychology a natural science or a human science? Is psychology a singular and coherent discipline or is it a house divided? These two issues are of great significance in understanding the status of the history of psychology course.
Kuhn (1970) suggested that the "consensus" as a defining characteristic of normal science is lacking in psychology. This lack of "normal science" status of psychology is also reflected in the ways in which the history of psychology is being taught. Tracing the ancient roots is one of the favored ways of teaching the history of psychology. These roots are relatively easy to order chronologically. First there was the golden age of the Greek scholarship, then came the Dark Ages, then came the renaissance and the British empiricism, and then followed the German physiologists. The neatly ordered chronology however, is lost upon entering the 20th century as diverging fields began to emerge all over. The major three distinct beginnings of psychology as Leahey (1980) calls it, grew simultaneously. Wundt and his volunteeristic psychology of consciousness, Darwin and James and their pragmatic functional approach , Freud and his psychoanalytical psychology of the unconscious, were born and raised within the same time frame. Also, fields within fields, specializations within specializations dominated the growth of psychology. Importantly, this growth has not been linear, but rather scattered in varied directions.
The goal of cohesion and consensus within the discipline has thus remained only elusive. As a human science, psychology comprises of "fields that are structured in an agonistic manner, fields which are characteized by deep divisions between alternative schools of thought" (Danziger (1994, p. 471). Danziger (1994) states that even the historiography of psychology has changed due to cultural critiques from around the globe against the "American hegemony in psychology" (p.476). He also states that "modern psychology is returning to the position from which it began: a polycentric position in which there are diverse but intercommunicating centres of psychological work that reflect a diversity of local conditions and traditions" (p. 477).
Beyond the divisions, sections and centres of psychology that are seen across APA, CPA, and elsewhere, the division between natural and human science perspectives has played a major role in academic divorce and separation (Tonks, 1997; Wand, 1993; Conway, 1992; Leahey, 1991; Danziger, 1990; Staats, 1987). The identity crisis of the discipline dates back to over the 100 or so years since it was first proclaimed that psychology was scientific. Leahey (1991), for example, points out that American psychology has been fraught with debate and "walkouts" over the appropriate nature of our discipline as a "pure" science or an applied profession. In Canada, this too has been a dominant theme since inception. However, beginning with the 1955 MacLeod Report, more intensive debate has emerged over whether or not we are or should be pure or professional (Wand, 1993; Conway, 1992; Danziger 1990). Historically, this controversy; whether psychology is "pure" or "applied" which embroiled Titchener and subsequently his protégé E. G. Boring, is still well and alive with us today.
What is the implication of the lack of the disciplinary cohesion and consensus? Danziger (1994) has contended that the very fact that the discipline lacks cohesion and has remained filled with divisions has necessitated the study of the history of psychology within the discipline. It follows that as long as there are "isms" and systems and theories, undergraduate psychology students will need a course on the history of psychology since it is the only course that would put all these isms into a larger "scientific" perspective.
Does the lack of cohesion and consensus then ensures the presence of the history of psychology courses at an undergraduate level? Perhaps not, as doubts are being raised by some scholars. For example, upon reflecting on the nature of the discipline today, Leahey (2000) the president of the Division 26 of APA (History and Philosophy of Psychology) observed that in contemporary psychology, there seem to be no major "isms" and no "big pictures" anymore that students need to know. Leahey has further appealed to the Division 26 members to ponder over the need to revise the course content in view of the rapidly changing discipline. Citing the changing ethos of psychology from that of the 1950s and 60s when it had a renaissance, he further suggests that the canonical approach to education where the history of psychology is seen as being essential to the Bildung or character development of our students may no longer be relevant. We need to decide among the alternatives of defending the status quo, changing the content but not the required necessity of it, or changing the requirement, and possibly also the content of it.
The Problem and the Threat to the Teaching of Psychology's History
The consequences of the shifting and contradictory perspectives on the larger discipline have filtered into the pedagogical domains. As such there are two major challenges involved in teaching of psychology's history today. One is to decide on the direction and the content of the course, and the other, a more serious one is justifying its relevance to one's esteemed colleagues and decision makers in their departments. A related spin-off issue pertains to the hiring of an expert to teach the course. .
The Direction and the Content of the Course
Danziger (1994) suggested that the traditional content of the history of psychology needed to change from a 'celebratory' 'insider' view to a more critical 'outsider' perspective. He points out that the positivist 'Whig' approach to history has largely been celebratory where history merely plays a supportive role for current dogma and ideologies of psychology. Rather, he contends, the history of psychology needs to offer a critical historiography of the discipline, one that more typically arises through a social or human science recognition of the social context of disciplinary activity.
Rappard (1997) responded to Danziger's initial concerns over the future of the history of psychology by suggesting that the "insider" perspective is not so bad after all. He contended that by giving our history away to professional historians (critical outsider) we are likely to have an irrelevant history, one that would look more like philosophy than psychology. (Rappard, 1998). Not being necessarily against critical historiography, Rappard indicated that the question of 'moral distance' arises as to what the appropriate distance on the 'outside' would be to be acceptable for the production of critical histories.
Danziger (1997) indicates that a critical historiography is essential if psychology is ever to make a significant contribution to the field. The essence of the problem is that historical amateurism is abound in psychology where:
we find histories that are no more than literature reviews extended backward in time, we find story telling substituting for history, we find the cult of 'anticipators' and the awarding of good and bad marks on the basis of some current scientific orthodoxy, we find gross insensitivity to historical context, we find the formulation of 'timeless' problems in the language of the present, we find the construction of spurious lines of ancestry, we find the mythology of progress. What historian of psychology could feel smug in the face of such shortcomings?
(1997, p. 108).
Dehue (1998) suggests that this debate between Danziger and Rappard lies in the notions of rigour vs. relevance. She provides an account that conceptualizes both Danziger and Rappard as "community historians" who each have their own contributions to make. Thus she indicates that a "contextualist" approach would serve to bring both views together enabling each one their own voice. Rappard (1998) rejects this interpretation of Dehue's, where she opposes contextualism with presentism, indicating his acceptance of both. Rather he concludes with Dehue's point that historians are "commissioned" to write histories close to contemporary views as a dangerous caricature of presentism and his "household" view of history. Finally, Danziger (1998) responds by indicating that the "occasional contextualism" that he ascribes to Dehue is not sufficient whereby there is a deep and essential need to recognize the situated nature of the historian and historical studies. He states:
No matter how hard one tries, one cannot step outside history in order to write about it. Every historian occupies a particular place in a historical world and can only describe the historical process as it appears from the perspective afforded by that place. ... That is why history will always be rewritten." (1998, p.670).
In summary, we see that there is considerable interest over whether or not psychology should include a (canonical) history of the discipline, and if so what that would look like. Danziger (1994) indicates that there has been a decline in the "insider" histories over the past 40 years, however, recent events suggest that the current trend involves a decline in the critical historiography as well.
The De-valuing of the Undergraduate Course on Psychology's History
Danziger (1994) made a very convincing case that the lack of the natural science status of psychology combined with the "isms" and divisions within the discipline would make the study of the history of psychology indispensable. This optimism is comforting, but at the extreme, there seems to be a trend emerging to discount the value of the history of psychology courses altogether. In a less extreme, but equally of crisis fashion, the critical historiographic approach is being challenged and squeezed aside by curricular changes based upon ideological warfare.
We witnessed this ideological warfare at three universities, which took several forms. Among them were: i) not replacing the retired "history of psychology" faculty, ii) hiring "external" faculty to teach the history of psychology course, iii) scrapping the history of psychology course as a requirement for major at an undergraduate level, iv) not offering any history of psychology course at the graduate level, and v) shortening the credits assigned to the course.
We briefly present a case study of one university as an illustration:
The Case of Gradual Disappearance
Around the same time, a scenario was unfolding at another university mirroring these events. An esteemed historian of psychology nearing his retirement around 1990s faced a growing antagonism towards his year-long history course. In a personal conversation he conveyed with sadness and some bitterness that the course would stay alive only as long as he was in the department. Indeed, as soon as he retired, his position disappeared. As well, his year-long course was cut into half. A young faculty member with interest in the "cognition" area of psychology was assigned to take over. As well, an "external", a post-doctoral fellow with philosophy background, has been now hired to teach psychology's history to undergraduate students.
The implications of the reduction in courses and disappearance of some of the faculty positions are already being felt. The new PhDs who specialize in the field of history of psychology seem to experience greater challenges and frustration in finding a university job. Katalin Dzinas (1995), for example, in her tribute to Kurt Danziger reflected that, whereas Kurt Danziger represents a privileged voice, in that he had a tenure, and who turned to history later in his career, and only after achieving full professorship, new PhDs do not see a favorable career future in the history of psychology. As Katalin expressed her worries:
We worry whether we will be able to secure a job as historians of psychology… None of us wish to work as closet historians, pretending at all times to be something we are not and doing research on problems in which we are not particularly interested…We worry that we may not be able to secure grant money to fund our research… We might not have the opportunity to supervise students who wish to work in this area
(Dzinas, 1995, P. 33)
One senior faculty member teaching history who has advocated the critical approach, indicated that he wished to remain "off the record" for fear of reprisal from his colleagues. However he did reveal that he had been told by one of the "backroom architects" of these changes that the main reason for "getting rid" of the courses presenting critical historiography is that they "would not enable him to do the kind of psychology that he would like to do." This is because students had become too critical and he could not convince them that his type of psychology was worth doing. This attitude is reflected in a recent book review from JHBS that indicates a weariness of the critical approach where "biographers amplify private faults of a scientist and neglect his or her contributions to the history of ideas" (Rilling, 1998, p. 390)
What might be more interesting than the fact that history has been reduced to fewer courses and faculty, is the rationale behind these changes. The official story is that such changes will make the department "more competitive" against other programmes nationally and internationally, however, unofficially informants have indicated that it is a positivist backlash against the critical historiography that had emerged through the 1990s. It is also of great interest that not only did the history of psychology courses witness a reduction in their canonical role in undergraduate education, but that other areas (notably statistics and measurement courses) witnessed an increase in their canonical role as required courses
Dehue (1997) also echoes this view when she states "it is my grounded impression that [critical] historians rubbing against psychologists' shoulders are more likely to evoke their irritation than their sympathy" (p. 659). Only time will tell, but Danziger's vision of the future of history of psychology appears to be in peril, ironically due in part to the success of his own work.
Danziger's conviction based on his analytical scrutiny and profound insight has assured us that given the "isms" and sharp divisions within the field, history of psychology will retain its anchoring status. However, this is the "critical history" or historiography that Danziger has talked about, and it has led to a wave of new scholarship in the field. However, what we have observed is that at the undergraduate level, the exciting historiography research does not make a headway. The textbooks seem to ignore these research findings, and the instructors, a large number of whom tend to be either "non-expert" or "external" continue with the "celebratory" whiggish account of psychology's history. Amidst this, the self-acclaimed "hard-core scientists" within the psychology departments continually discount the value of the undergraduate course on psychology's history. We have witnessed the backlash that Dehue.(1997) commented on.. Several years ago, when our section organized a symposium on "post-positivism", some of our esteemed colleagues sarcastically commented that just because a bunch of theoretical types declare a death, does not mean that positivism is dead. It was further added that they would plan a rejoinder titled "Positivism strikes back"!!
It seems to us that the more that historiography has gained, the more seem to have been lost at the pedagogical level. Historiography will likely continue to prosper, but we are not so optimistic about its pedagogical future.
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Undergraduate History of Psychology Across Canadian Universities
Undergraduate History of Psychology Across Canadian Universities
History of Psychology Course
12 (out of 20)**